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dc.contributor.authorLehmann, Stefanie Anielaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-29T10:08:36Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-29T10:08:36Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37026-
dc.description.abstractcollective tournament, incentives, randomization, risken_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherGraduate School of Economics Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBonn econ discussion papers 2008,19en_US
dc.subject.jelD2en_US
dc.subject.jelJ3en_US
dc.subject.jelM5en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcollective tournamenten_US
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordrandomizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisken_US
dc.subject.stwGruppenarbeiten_US
dc.subject.stwExtensives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleWhen randomization in collective tournaments is profitable for the principalen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn60334061Xen_US
dc.description.abstracttransIn the context of principal-agent theory risk is largely seen as a source that causes inefficiencies and lowers incentives and accordingly is not in the principal's interest. In this paper I compare two different designs of a collective tournament where output in a team is generated through a particular two-stage production process. I show within a theoretical tournament framework that risk in terms of chance is beneficial from the point of view of a profit maximizing principal who organizes the tournament. Selecting an agent randomly that has to work at the final stage after all agents exerted effort at the first stage helps the principal to overcome a trade-off in incentive provision he faces when selecting the agent who works at the final stage before the tournament starts. This trade-o¤ causes optimal efforts to be lower in a tournament without random selection compared to a tournament with random selection. As the higher efforts overcompensate additional wage costs the principal earns higher expected profits when selecting the agent that has to work at the second stage randomly after the first stage.en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

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