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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36958
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| Title: | | Competitive preferences and status as an incentive: Experimental evidence  |
| Authors: | | Charness, Gary Masclet, David Villeval, Marie-Claire |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5034 |
| Abstract: | | In this paper, we investigate individuals' investment in status in an environment where no monetary return can possibly be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to learn and potentially improve their status (rank). We find that people express both intrinsic motivation and a taste for status. Indeed, people increase their effort when they are simply informed about their relative performance, and people pay both to sabotage others' output and to artificially increase their own relative performance. In addition, stronger group identity favors positive rivalry and discourages sabotage among peers. |
| Subjects: | | Status seeking rank competitive preferences experiment |
| JEL: | | C91 C92 M54 D63 J28 J31 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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