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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36906
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| Title: | | Earnings progression, human capital and incentives: Theory and evidence  |
| Authors: | | Frederiksen, Anders |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 4863 |
| Abstract: | | The career prospects of newly recruited employees differ substantially within an organization. The stars experience a considerable growth in earnings; others can hardly maintain their entry salaries. This article sheds light on the mechanisms generating the observed heterogeneity in earnings progression by investigating the effects of on-the-job human capital acquisition, explicit short-run incentives and career concern incentives on earnings progression. The model leads to predictions about the incentive structure and the progression in both cross-sectional and individual earnings which are supported by the empirical analysis based on personnel records from a large bank. |
| Subjects: | | Explicit incentives career concern incentives performance earnings dynamics personnel economics |
| JEL: | | J30 J41 M50 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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