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IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36857
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Altmann, Steffen | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Falk, Armin | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Huffman, David | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-06-22 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-07-23T09:34:04Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-07-23T09:34:04Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36857 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We analyze the impact of imperfect contract enforcement on the emergence of unemployment. In an experimental labor market where trading parties can form long-term employment relationships, we compare a work environment where effort is observable, but not verifiable to a situation where explicit contracts are feasible. Our main result shows that unemployment is much higher when third-party contract enforcement is absent. Unemployment is involuntary, being caused by firms' employment and contracting policy. Moreover, we show that implicit contracting can lead to a segmentation of the labor market. Firms in both segments earn similar profits, but workers in the secondary sector face much less favorable conditions than their counterparts in primary-sector jobs. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | IZA Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5001 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C92 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J64 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M55 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Incentives | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | implicit contracts | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | unemployment | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | fairness | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | dual labor markets | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Arbeitsvertrag | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Implizite Kontrakte | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Leistungsanreiz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Gerechtigkeit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Dualer Arbeitsmarkt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Arbeitsbedingungen | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Test | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Implicit contracts, unemployment, and labor market segmentation | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 629762724 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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