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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/36844
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Bartelsman, Eric J. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Gautier, Pieter A. | en |
dc.contributor.author | de Wind, Joris | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-04 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-07-23T09:33:28Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-23T09:33:28Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36844 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Using a country-industry panel dataset (EUKLEMS) we uncover a robust empirical regularity, namely that high-risk innovative sectors are relatively smaller in countries with strict employment protection legislation (EPL). To understand the mechanism, we develop a two-sector matching model where firms endogenously choose between a safe technology with known productivity and a risky technology with productivity subject to sizeable shocks. Strict EPL makes the risky technology relatively less attractive because it is more costly to shed workers upon receiving a low productivity draw. We calibrate the model using a variety of aggregate, industry and micro-level data sources. We then simulate the model to reflect both the observed differences across countries in EPL and the observed increase since the mid-1990s in the variance of firm performance associated with the adoption of information and communication technology. The simulations produce a differential response to the arrival of risky technology between low- and high-EPL countries that coincides with the findings in the data. The described mechanism can explain a considerable portion of the slowdown in productivity in the EU relative to the US since 1995. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x4895 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J65 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O38 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Employment protection legislation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | exit costs | en |
dc.subject.keyword | information and communications technology | en |
dc.subject.keyword | heterogeneous productivity | en |
dc.subject.keyword | sectoral allocation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitnehmerschutz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Technologiewahl | en |
dc.subject.stw | Hochtechnologiesektor | en |
dc.subject.stw | Risiko | en |
dc.subject.stw | Mehr-Sektoren-Modell | en |
dc.subject.stw | Produktivität | en |
dc.subject.stw | Informationstechnik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Sektorale Beschäftigungsstruktur | en |
dc.subject.stw | Allokation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Vergleich | en |
dc.subject.stw | EU-Staaten | en |
dc.subject.stw | USA | en |
dc.title | Employment protection, technology choice, and worker allocation | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 625181581 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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