Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36785
Authors: 
McAusland, Carol
Kuhn, Peter
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 4936
Abstract: 
We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from a global welfare perspective. These incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth, thus allowing them to prevent the 'poaching' of their 'brains' by larger, wealthier markets.
Subjects: 
Intellectual property rights
development
brain drain
international labor migration
JEL: 
F22
J6
O34
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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