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dc.contributor.authorBelke, Ansgaren_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-22T09:28:56Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-22T09:28:56Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/36733-
dc.description.abstractThe ECB has accepted increasing amounts of rubbish collateral since the crisis started leading to exposure to serious private sector credit risk (i.e. default risk) on its collateralised lending and reverse operations (repo). This has led some commentators to argue that the ECB needs fiscal back-up to cover any potential losses to be able to continue pursuing price stability. This Brief argues that fiscal backing is not necessary for the ECB for three reasons. Firstly, the ECB balance sheet risk is small compared to the FED and BoE as it neither increased its quasi-fiscal operations as much as the Fed or the BoE nor did it engage to a very large extent in outright bond purchases during the financial crisis. Secondly, the ECB's specific accounting principles of repo operations provide for more clarity and earlier recognition of losses. Thirdly, the ECB can draw on substantial reserves of the euro area national banks.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion papers // German Institute for Economic Research 996en_US
dc.subject.jelG32en_US
dc.subject.jelE42en_US
dc.subject.jelE51en_US
dc.subject.jelE58en_US
dc.subject.jelE63en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCentral bank independenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordcentral bank capitalen_US
dc.subject.keywordcounterparty risken_US
dc.subject.keywordrepurchase agreementsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcollateralen_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal backingen_US
dc.subject.keywordliquidityen_US
dc.subject.keywordhaircutsen_US
dc.subject.stwZentralbankautonomieen_US
dc.subject.stwEigenkapitalen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzmarktkriseen_US
dc.subject.stwKreditsicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwPensionsgeschäften_US
dc.subject.stwBankenliquiditäten_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Anleiheen_US
dc.subject.stwEurozoneen_US
dc.titleHow much fiscal backing must the ECB have? The euro area is not the Philippinesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn625126580en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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DIW-Diskussionspapiere

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