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Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin >
DIW-Diskussionspapiere >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36708
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Belke, Ansgar | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | von Schnurbein, Barbara | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-03-25 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-07-22T09:28:31Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-07-22T09:28:31Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36708 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We analyze the ECB Governing Council's voting procedures. The literature has by now discussed numerous aspects of the rotation model but does not account for many institutional aspects of the voting procedure of the GC. Using the randomization scheme based on the multilinear extension (MLE) of games, we try to close three of these gaps. First, we integrate specific preferences of national central bank presidents, i.e. their desired interest rates. Second, we address the agenda-setting power of the ECB president. Third, we do not simulate an average of the decisions but look at every relevant point in time separately. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Discussion papers // German Institute for Economic Research 983 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D78 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | E58 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Euro area | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | European Central Bank | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | monetary policy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | rotation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | voting rights | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Zentralbank | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Abstimmungsregel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Reform | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Abstimmung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Machtindex | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | European monetary policy and the ECB rotation model voting power of the core versus the periphery | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 622661744 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des DIW DIW-Diskussionspapiere
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