Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36708
Authors: 
Belke, Ansgar
von Schnurbein, Barbara
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion papers // German Institute for Economic Research 983
Abstract: 
We analyze the ECB Governing Council's voting procedures. The literature has by now discussed numerous aspects of the rotation model but does not account for many institutional aspects of the voting procedure of the GC. Using the randomization scheme based on the multilinear extension (MLE) of games, we try to close three of these gaps. First, we integrate specific preferences of national central bank presidents, i.e. their desired interest rates. Second, we address the agenda-setting power of the ECB president. Third, we do not simulate an average of the decisions but look at every relevant point in time separately.
Subjects: 
Euro area
European Central Bank
monetary policy
rotation
voting rights
JEL: 
D72
D78
E58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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