Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36672
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dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.contributor.authorHäger, Kirstenen_US
dc.contributor.authorKirchkamp, Oliveren_US
dc.contributor.authorSchwalbach, Joachimen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-05en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-20T13:51:11Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-20T13:51:11Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/36672-
dc.description.abstractLike Feinberg and Sherman (1985) and Phillips and Mason (1992) we test experimentally whether conglomerate firms, i.e., firms competing on multiple structurally unrelated markets, can effectively limit competition. Our more general analysis assumes differentiated rather than homogeneous products and distinguishes strategic substitutes as well as complements to test this forbearance hypothesis. Rather than only a partners design we also explore a random strangers design to disentangle effects of forbearance and repeated interaction. Surprisingly, conglomerate firms do not limit competition, they rather foster it. More in line with our expectations we find more cooperation in complement markets than in substitute markets and also more cooperation in a partners than in a strangers matching.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. [u.a.] |cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena economic research papers |x2010,043en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelL41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordForbearanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordCompetitionen_US
dc.titleTesting forbearance experimentally: Duopolistic competition of conglomerate firmsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn630558116en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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