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dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.contributor.authorHäger, Kirstenen_US
dc.contributor.authorKirchkamp, Oliveren_US
dc.contributor.authorSchwalbach, Joachimen_US
dc.description.abstractLike Feinberg and Sherman (1985) and Phillips and Mason (1992) we test experimentally whether conglomerate firms, i.e., firms competing on multiple structurally unrelated markets, can effectively limit competition. Our more general analysis assumes differentiated rather than homogeneous products and distinguishes strategic substitutes as well as complements to test this forbearance hypothesis. Rather than only a partners design we also explore a random strangers design to disentangle effects of forbearance and repeated interaction. Surprisingly, conglomerate firms do not limit competition, they rather foster it. More in line with our expectations we find more cooperation in complement markets than in substitute markets and also more cooperation in a partners than in a strangers matching.en_US
dc.publisherUniv. [u.a.] Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2010,043en_US
dc.titleTesting forbearance experimentally: Duopolistic competition of conglomerate firmsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers (2007-2014), Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik und Universität Jena

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