Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/36672 
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dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren
dc.contributor.authorHäger, Kirstenen
dc.contributor.authorKirchkamp, Oliveren
dc.contributor.authorSchwalbach, Joachimen
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-05-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-20T13:51:11Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-20T13:51:11Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/36672-
dc.description.abstractLike Feinberg and Sherman (1985) and Phillips and Mason (1992) we test experimentally whether conglomerate firms, i.e., firms competing on multiple structurally unrelated markets, can effectively limit competition. Our more general analysis assumes differentiated rather than homogeneous products and distinguishes strategic substitutes as well as complements to test this forbearance hypothesis. Rather than only a partners design we also explore a random strangers design to disentangle effects of forbearance and repeated interaction. Surprisingly, conglomerate firms do not limit competition, they rather foster it. More in line with our expectations we find more cooperation in complement markets than in substitute markets and also more cooperation in a partners than in a strangers matching.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2010,043en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.jelL41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordExperimenten
dc.subject.keywordForbearanceen
dc.subject.keywordCompetitionen
dc.titleTesting forbearance experimentally: Duopolistic competition of conglomerate firms-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn630558116en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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