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dc.contributor.authorCanavire-Bacarreza, Gustavoen_US
dc.contributor.authorNunnenkamp, Peteren_US
dc.contributor.authorThiele, Raineren_US
dc.contributor.authorTriveño, Luisen_US
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we perform a Tobit analysis of aid allocation, covering the period 1999-2002 and accounting for both altruistic and selfish donor motives. It turns out that poorer countries get clearly more aid from both bilateral and multilateral donors. Most donors are also found to direct significantly more aid to well-governed recipients if governance is measured by the World Bank?s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). If the CPIA is replaced by the Kaufmann index on institutional conditions in recipient countries, however, the policy orientation of aid becomes extremely weak. In contrast to a recent paper by Dollar and Levin, our estimates do not suggest that multilateral aid is more poverty- and policy-oriented than bilateral aid. Post-conflict resolution emerges as a significant determinant of aid allocation in 2002. The importance of selfish aid motives clearly differs between bilateral and multilateral donors. In particular, the export-related self- interest of donor countries provided a fairly strong incentive to grant bilateral aid, as did colonial ties.en_US
dc.publisherKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesKieler Arbeitspapiere 1253en_US
dc.subject.keywordForeign aid allocationen_US
dc.subject.keywordDonor motives-
dc.subject.keywordTobit analysis-
dc.subject.stwInternationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungenen_US
dc.titleAssessing the allocation of aid: Developmental concerns and the self-interest of donorsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Kieler Arbeitspapiere, IfW
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