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Technische Universität Dresden >
Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Technische Universität Dresden >
Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics, TU Dresden >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36482
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| Title: | | The banking firm: the role of signaling with collaterals  |
| Authors: | | Bieta, Volker Broll, Udo Siebe, Wilfried |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Dresden discussion paper series in economics 04/08 |
| Abstract: | | In this paper we challenge basic results of signaling models. In our banking model each project of a borrower is described by a continuous density of outcomes. Different density functions are classified according to second stochastisch dominance. Combining these features we find that in a banking model collateral is no longer in a position to signal the degree of riskiness of the borrower to the lender. In most cases the equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium. |
| Subjects: | | Signaling collateral perfect Bayesian equilibrium |
| JEL: | | D8 G20 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics, TU Dresden
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