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dc.contributor.authorLessmann, Christianen_US
dc.contributor.authorMarkwardt, Guntheren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-15T09:39:17Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-15T09:39:17Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/36476-
dc.description.abstractThe majority of theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between decentralization and corruption argues that the devolution of power might be a feasible instrument to keep corruption at bay. We argue that this result crucially depends on the possibility to monitor bureaucrat's behavior. The benefits of interjurisdictional competition only occur if there is a supervisory body such as a free press, which is often lacking in less-developed countries. Using crosscountry data, we analyze the relationship between decentralization and corruption taking different degrees of the freedom of the press into account. Our main finding is that decentralization counteracts corruption in countries with high degrees of press freedom, whereas countries with low monitoring possibilities suffer from decentralization. Our policy implication is, therefore, that a free press is a necessary pre-condition for successful decentralization programs.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. of Technology, Fac. of Business Management and Economics Dresdenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDresden discussion paper series in economics 14/08en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.jelH72en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddecentralizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordfreedom of pressen_US
dc.subject.stwGewaltenteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwDezentralisierungen_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwMeinungsfreiheiten_US
dc.subject.stwBürokratieen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleOne size fits all? Decentralization, corruption, and the monitoring of bureaucratsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn590262629en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tuddps:1408-
Appears in Collections:Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics, TU Dresden

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