EconStor >
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36352
  
Title:Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams in experimental normal-form games PDF Logo
Authors:Sutter, Matthias
Czermak, Simon
Feri, Francesco
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:IZA Discussion Papers 4732
Abstract:We present an experiment on strategic thinking and behavior of individuals and teams in one-shot normal-form games. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often consistent by being a best reply to first order beliefs. We identify the complexity of a game and the payoffs in equilibrium as determining the likelihood of consistent behavior according to textbook rationality. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals.
Subjects:Strategic sophistication
beliefs
experiment
team decision making
individual decision making
JEL:C72
C91
C92
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
620398612.pdf389.91 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36352

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.