Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36267
Authors: 
Cigno, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 4635
Abstract: 
We use elementary game-theoretical concepts to compare domestic equilibria with and without marriage. In particular, we examine the effects of marriage legislation, matrimonial property regime, and divorce court sentencing practice, on the decision to marry, and on the choice of game conditional on marriage. We find that, in the absence of social stigma or legal discrimination against unmarried couples, a couple will marry only if marriage serves as a commitment device which facilitates cooperation.
Subjects: 
Gender
cohabitation
marriage
divorce
alimony
matrimonial property
fertility
division of labour
JEL: 
D13
J12
J13
J16
J24
K30
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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