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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36267
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| Title: | | What's the use of marriage?  |
| Authors: | | Cigno, Alessandro |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | IZA Discussion Papers 4635 |
| Abstract: | | We use elementary game-theoretical concepts to compare domestic equilibria with and without marriage. In particular, we examine the effects of marriage legislation, matrimonial property regime, and divorce court sentencing practice, on the decision to marry, and on the choice of game conditional on marriage. We find that, in the absence of social stigma or legal discrimination against unmarried couples, a couple will marry only if marriage serves as a commitment device which facilitates cooperation. |
| Subjects: | | Gender cohabitation marriage divorce alimony matrimonial property fertility division of labour |
| JEL: | | D13 J12 J13 J16 J24 K30 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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