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Title:Job search with bidder memories PDF Logo
Authors:Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos
Menzio, Guido
Smith, Eric
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:IZA Discussion Papers 4319
Abstract:This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.
Subjects:Job search
recall
wage determination
Diamond paradox
JEL:J24
J42
J64
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:101:1-20090825586
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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