Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/36172 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 4373
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This study models producer protection legislation that would grant growers the right to claim damages (PPLD) if their contracts are prematurely terminated. In the absence of contracting frictions that prevent contractors from redesigning contracts to accommodate exogenous policy changes, PPLD would not be distortionary or redistributive. If contracting frictions exist, then PPLD would have efficiency and redistributive effects, though the direction and magnitude depends on the size of PPL damages vis-à-vis expected damages under existing contract law. This study clarifies the conditions under which PPLD would decrease efficiency and protect growers.
Schlagwörter: 
Contracts
moral hazard
agricultural policy
producer protection legislation
contract law
JEL: 
Q12
Q18
K12
D82
D86
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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