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dc.contributor.authorChamon, Marcosen_US
dc.contributor.authorde Mello, João M. P.en_US
dc.contributor.authorFirpo, Sergioen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-16en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T12:06:11Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T12:06:11Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/36118-
dc.description.abstractWe exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a runoff election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. We show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. We use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current expenditures, particularly personnel expenditures. The impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA Discussion Papers 4658en_US
dc.subject.jelH72en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelC14en_US
dc.subject.jelP1en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordElectoral systemsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordregression discontinuityen_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal expendituresen_US
dc.subject.stwKommunale Finanzpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwKommunalwahlen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlsystemen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwBrasilienen_US
dc.titleElectoral rules, political competition and fiscal expenditures: regression discontinuity evidence from Brazilian municipalitiesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn618690875en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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