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Title:Layoff costs and efficiency with asymmetric information PDF Logo
Authors:Delacroix, Alain
Wasmer, Etienne
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:IZA Discussion Papers 4524
Abstract:Wage determination under asymmetric information generates inefficiencies due to excess turnover. Severance pay and layoff taxes can improve efficiency. We show that inefficient separations can even be fully removed with fixed separation taxes in the case where the relevant private information is exponentially distributed.
Subjects:Bargaining
asymmetric information
employment protection legislation
inefficient job separations
JEL:J41
J60
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:101:1-20091105958
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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