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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/36039
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Dur, Robert | en |
dc.contributor.author | Non, Arjan | en |
dc.contributor.author | Roelfsema, Hein | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-16 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-07-07T12:05:36Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-07T12:05:36Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36039 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We empirically examine these predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x4782 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D86 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J41 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M51 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M52 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M54 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M55 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Reciprocity | en |
dc.subject.keyword | social exchange | en |
dc.subject.keyword | incentive contracts | en |
dc.subject.keyword | double moral hazard | en |
dc.subject.keyword | GSOEP | en |
dc.subject.stw | Anreizvertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verantwortung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Moral Hazard | en |
dc.subject.stw | Deutschland | en |
dc.title | Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 621169404 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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