|
EconStor >
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36039
|
| | |
Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Dur, Robert | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Non, Arjan | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Roelfsema, Hein | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-03-16 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-07-07T12:05:36Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-07-07T12:05:36Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36039 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We empirically examine these predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | IZA Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | IZA Discussion Papers 4782 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D86 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J41 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M51 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M52 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M54 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M55 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Reciprocity | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | social exchange | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | incentive contracts | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | double moral hazard | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | GSOEP | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Anreizvertrag | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verantwortung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Moral Hazard | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Deutschland | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 621169404 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|