Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36039
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDur, Roberten_US
dc.contributor.authorNon, Arjanen_US
dc.contributor.authorRoelfsema, Heinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-16en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T12:05:36Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T12:05:36Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/36039-
dc.description.abstractWe study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We empirically examine these predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x4782en_US
dc.subject.jelD86en_US
dc.subject.jelJ41en_US
dc.subject.jelM51en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.jelM54en_US
dc.subject.jelM55en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordReciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial exchangeen_US
dc.subject.keywordincentive contractsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddouble moral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordGSOEPen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwVerantwortungen_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleReciprocity and incentive pay in the workplaceen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn621169404en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
229.92 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.