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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 4782
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We empirically examine these predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay.
Schlagwörter: 
Reciprocity
social exchange
incentive contracts
double moral hazard
GSOEP
JEL: 
D86
J41
M51
M52
M54
M55
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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