Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36039
Authors: 
Dur, Robert
Non, Arjan
Roelfsema, Hein
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 4782
Abstract: 
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We empirically examine these predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay.
Subjects: 
Reciprocity
social exchange
incentive contracts
double moral hazard
GSOEP
JEL: 
D86
J41
M51
M52
M54
M55
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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