|
EconStor >
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36039
|
| | |
| Title: | | Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace  |
| Authors: | | Dur, Robert Non, Arjan Roelfsema, Hein |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | IZA Discussion Papers 4782 |
| Abstract: | | We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We empirically examine these predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay. |
| Subjects: | | Reciprocity social exchange incentive contracts double moral hazard GSOEP |
| JEL: | | D86 J41 M51 M52 M54 M55 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36039
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|