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dc.contributor.authorSaint-Paul, Gillesen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T12:05:32Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T12:05:32Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/36029-
dc.description.abstractIn order to credibly sell legitimate children to their spouse, women must forego more attractive mating opportunities. This paper derives the implications of this observation for the pattern of matching in marriage markets, the dynamics of human capital accumulation, and the evolution of the gene pool. A key consequence of the trade-off faced by women is that marriage markets will naturally tend to be hypergamous - that is, a marriage is more likely to be beneficial to both parties relative to remaining single, the greater the man's human capital, and the lower the woman's human capital. As a consequence, it is shown that the equilibrium can only be of two types. In the Victorian type, all agents marry somebody of the same rank in the distribution of income. In the Sex and the City (SATC) type, women marry men who are better ranked than themselves. There is a mass of unmarried men at the bottom of the distribution of human capital, and a mass of single women at the top of that distribution. It is shown that the economy switches from a Victorian to an SATC equilibrium as inequality goes up. The model sheds light on how marriage affects the returns to human capital for men and women. Absent marriage, these returns are larger for women than for men but the opposite may occur if marriage prevails. Finally, it is shown that the institution of marriage may or may not favour human capital accumulation depending on how genes affect one's productivity at accumulating human capital.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherForschungsinst. zur Zukunft der Arbeit Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA Discussion Papers 4456en_US
dc.subject.jelD1en_US
dc.subject.jelD13en_US
dc.subject.jelD3en_US
dc.subject.jelE24en_US
dc.subject.jelI2en_US
dc.subject.jelJ12en_US
dc.subject.jelJ13en_US
dc.subject.jelJ16en_US
dc.subject.jelK36en_US
dc.subject.jelO15en_US
dc.subject.jelO43en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMarriage marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordhuman capital accumulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordhypergamyen_US
dc.subject.keywordoverlapping generationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordlegitimacyen_US
dc.subject.stwHumankapitalen_US
dc.subject.stwEheen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Schichten_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Ungleichheiten_US
dc.subject.stwOverlapping Generationsen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleGenes, legitimacy and hypergamy: another look at the economics of marriageen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn613724259en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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