Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35982 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 4420
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We construct a simple model of compulsory schooling in which legislation and compliance are endogenously determined by individuals disciplined by social norms, optimizing their voting decisions and the school attendance of their children. The model provides a formal framework for interpreting empirical results on the effect of compulsory-schooling legislation (CSL) on enrollment. This sheds light on the use of CSL as an instrumental variable to identify the benefits of schooling, suggesting how the estimates it produces may be biased.
Subjects: 
Education
compulsory schooling
compliance norms
JEL: 
I21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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