Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35959
Authors: 
Acemoglu, Daron
Ticchi, Davide
Vindigni, Andrea
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 4418
Abstract: 
A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized armies, beyond the size necessary for fighting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the military in the future.
Subjects: 
Civil wars
commitment
coups
military
political transitions
political economy
JEL: 
H2
N10
N40
P16
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
185.64 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.