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dc.contributor.authorBougheas, Spiros P.en
dc.contributor.authorDasgupta, Indraneelen
dc.contributor.authorMorrissey, Oliveren
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-27-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T12:03:42Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T12:03:42Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35878-
dc.description.abstractLenders condition future loans on some index of past performance. Typically, banks condition future loans on repayments of earlier obligations whilst international organizations (official lenders) condition future loans on the implementation of some policy action ('investment'). We build an agency model that accounts for these tendencies. The optimal conditionality contract depends on exclusivity - the likelihood that a borrower who has been denied funds from the original lenders can access funds from other lenders.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x4604en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.jelF34en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordLong-term loansen
dc.subject.keywordinvestment conditionsen
dc.subject.keywordrepayment conditionsen
dc.subject.keywordexclusivityen
dc.subject.stwKreditgeschäften
dc.subject.stwKonditionenen
dc.subject.stwKreditwürdigkeiten
dc.subject.stwAnpassungsprogramm des IWFen
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleRepayment versus investment conditions and exclusivity in lending contracts-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn617299269en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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