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dc.contributor.authorBrollo, Fernandaen_US
dc.contributor.authorNannicini, Tommasoen_US
dc.contributor.authorPerotti, Robertoen_US
dc.contributor.authorTabellini, Guidoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T12:02:33Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T12:02:33Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35858-
dc.description.abstractThe paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a version of the career concerns model of political agency with endogenous entry of political candidates. The evidence refers to municipalities in Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously according to given population thresholds. We exploit a regression discontinuity design to test the implications of the theory and identify the causal effect of larger federal transfers on political corruption and the observed features of political candidates at the municipal level. In accordance with the predictions of the theory, we find that larger transfers increase political corruption and reduce the quality of candidates for mayor.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA Discussion Papers 4706en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.jelH40en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordGovernment spendingen_US
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical selectionen_US
dc.subject.stwKommunalpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen_US
dc.subject.stwGemeindefinanzenen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwBrasilienen_US
dc.titleThe political resource curseen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn619848839en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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