Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35843
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dc.contributor.authorDanziger, Leifen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-16en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T12:01:47Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T12:01:47Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35843-
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows that increases in the minimum wage rate can have ambiguous effects on the working hours and welfare of employed workers in competitive labor markets. The reason is that employers may not comply with the minimum wage legislation and instead pay a lower subminimum wage rate. If workers are risk neutral, we prove that working hours and welfare are invariant to the minimum wage rate. If workers are risk averse and imprudent (which is the empirically likely case), then working hours decrease with the minimum wage rate, while their welfare may increase.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x4408en_US
dc.subject.jelJ38en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordNoncomplianceen_US
dc.subject.keywordminimum wageen_US
dc.subject.keywordworking hoursen_US
dc.subject.keywordwelfareen_US
dc.subject.keywordcompetitive labor marketsen_US
dc.subject.stwMindestlohnen_US
dc.subject.stwNormbefolgungen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeiteren_US
dc.subject.stwRisikopräferenzen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitszeiten_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarkttheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleNoncompliance and the effects of the minimum wage on hours and welfare in competitive labor marketsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn612902471en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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