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IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35794
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Jasso, Guillermina | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2008-12-02 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-07-07T11:58:31Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-07-07T11:58:31Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2008 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.pi | | urn:nbn:de:101:1-2008120298 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35794 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper proposes a new model of wage determination and wage inequality. In this model, wage-setters set workers' wages; they do so either directly, as when individuals vote in a salary committee, or indirectly, as when political parties, via the myriad of social, economic, fiscal, and other policies, generate wages. The recommendations made by wage-setters (or arising from their policies) form a distribution, and all the wage-setter-specific distributions are combined into a single final wage distribution. There may be any number of wage-setters; some wage-setters count more than others; and the wage-setters may differ among themselves on both the wage distribution and the amounts recommended for particular workers. We use probability theory to derive initial results, including both distribution-independent and distribution-specific results. Fortuitously, elements of the model correspond to basic democratic principles. Thus, the model yields implications for the effects of democracy on wage inequality. These include: (1) The effects of the number of wage-setters and their power depend on the configuration of agreements and disagreements; (2) Independence of mind reduces wage inequality, and dissent does so even more; (3) When leaders of democratic nations seek to forge an economic consensus, they are unwittingly inducing greater economic inequality; (4) Arguments for independent thinking will be more vigorous in small societies than in large societies; (5) Given a fixed distributional form for wages and two political parties which either ignore or oppose each other's distributional ideas, the closer the party split to 50-50, the lower the wage inequality; and (6) Under certain conditions the wage distribution within wage-setting context will be normal, but the normality will be obscured, as cross-context mixtures will display a wide variety of shapes. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | IZA Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | IZA discussion papers 3850 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C02 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Wage-setter | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | power | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | consensus | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | independence of mind | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | dissent | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | form of government | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | probability distributions | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | shifted exponential distribution | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | shifted general Erlang distribution | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | shifted mirror-exponential distribution | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Gini coefficient | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Lohnstruktur | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Einkommensverteilung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Lohnbildung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Public Choice | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Macht | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | A new model of wage determination and wage inequality | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 586145842 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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