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Title:Worker self-selection and the profits from cooperation PDF Logo
Authors:Kosfeld, Michael
von Siemens, Ferdinand
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:IZA discussion papers 3881
Abstract:We investigate a competitive labor market with team production. Workers differ in their motivation to exert team effort and types are private information. We show that there can exist a separating equilibrium in which workers self-select into different firms and firms employing cooperative workers make strictly positive profits. Profit differences across firms persist because cooperation strictly increases output and worker separation requires firms employing cooperative workers to pay out weakly lower wages.
Subjects:Team work
self-selection
JEL:D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:101:1-20081217231
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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