Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35742
Authors: 
Bellemare, Charles
Lepage, Patrick
Shearer, Bruce S.
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
IZA discussion papers 3948
Abstract: 
We present results from a real-effort experiment, simulating actual work-place conditions, comparing the productivity of workers under fixed wages and piece rates. Workers, who were paid to enter data, were exposed to different degrees of peer pressure under both payment systems. The peer pressure was generated in the form of private information about the productivity of their peers. We have two main results. First, we find no level of peer pressure for which the productivity of either male or female workers is significantly higher than productivity without peer pressure. Second, we find that very low and very high levels of peer pressure can significantly decrease productivity (particularly for men paid fixed wages). These results are consistent with models of conformism and self-motivation.
Subjects: 
Peer effects
fixed wages
piece rates
gender
JEL: 
M52
C91
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
448.97 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.