EconStor >
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35718
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorImmervoll, Herwigen_US
dc.contributor.authorKleven, Henrik Jacobsenen_US
dc.contributor.authorKreiner, Claus Thustrupen_US
dc.contributor.authorVerdelin, Nicolajen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-11en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:55:42Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:55:42Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2009021048en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35718-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents an evaluation of the tax-transfer treatment of married couples in 15 EU countries using the EUROMOD microsimulation model. First, we show that many tax-transfer schemes in Europe feature negative jointness defined as a situation where the tax rate on one person depends negatively on the earnings of the spouse. This stands in contrast to the previous literature on this question, which has focused on a specific form of positive jointness. The presence of negative jointness is driven by family-based and means-tested transfer programs combined with tax systems that usually feature very little jointness. Second, we consider the labour supply distortion on secondary earners relative to primary earners implied by the current tax-transfer systems, and study the welfare effects of small reforms that change the relative taxation of spouses. By adopting a small-reform methodology, it is possible to set out a simple analysis based on more realistic labour supply models than those considered in the existing literature. We present microsimulations showing that simple revenue-neutral reforms that lower the tax burden on secondary earners are associated with substantial welfare gains in most countries. Finally, we consider the tax-transfer implications of marriage and estimate the so-called marriage penalty. For most countries, we find large marriage penalties at the bottom of the distribution driven primarily by features of the transfer system.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA discussion papers 3965en_US
dc.subject.jelH20en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordLabour supplyen_US
dc.subject.keywordredistributionen_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal taxen_US
dc.subject.keywordcouplesen_US
dc.subject.keywordmarriage taxen_US
dc.subject.keywordjoint taxationen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren_US
dc.subject.stwFamilienbesteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerbelastungen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsangeboten_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerreformen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleAn evaluation of the tax-transfer treatment of married couples in European countriesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn591456095en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
591456095.pdf783.72 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.