EconStor >
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35713
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorApps, Patriciaen_US
dc.contributor.authorRees, Rayen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:55:39Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:55:39Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20090612132en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35713-
dc.description.abstractThis paper applies the theory of relational contracts to make precise the idea that because households are engaged in a repeated non-cooperative game, Pareto efficient outcomes can be supported by self interest, given the specific pattern of specialisation and exchange which exists in the household. The household's choice of a particular solution from the resulting feasible set is found by the maximisation of a household welfare function, a generalisation of a suggestion originally made by Samuelson. This nests as special cases the objective functions used in currently popular models of households engaged in one-shot cooperative games. We take a specific example of such a household welfare function, characterise the determinants of the household utility distribution, and then apply the model to examine the effects of a move from joint to individual taxation. We show that on standard stylised facts, secondary earners are always better off absolutely, and define the conditions under which they will also be so relatively. This confirms the conclusions from models which concern themselves only with the across-household welfare distribution.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA discussion papers 4189en_US
dc.subject.jelD11en_US
dc.subject.jelD13en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelH24en_US
dc.subject.jelH31en_US
dc.subject.jelJ12en_US
dc.subject.jelJ16en_US
dc.subject.jelK36en_US
dc.subject.jelN30en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordRelational contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordhouseholdsen_US
dc.subject.keywordallocationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordtaxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordwelfare distributionen_US
dc.subject.stwHaushaltsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwSteueren_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen_US
dc.subject.stwFamilienbesteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwirkungen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleRelational contracts, taxation and the householden_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn602120101en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
602120101.pdf170.41 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.