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IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35705
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Abeler, Johannes | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Falk, Armin | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Götte, Lorenz | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Huffman, David | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-22 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-07-07T11:55:33Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-07-07T11:55:33Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.pi | | urn:nbn:de:101:1-2009020995 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35705 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision. We find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | IZA Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | IZA discussion papers 3939 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C91 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D01 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D84 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J22 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Reference points | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | expectations | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | loss aversion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | risk aversion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | disappointment | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | experiment | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Leistungsmotivation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Erwartungstheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Präferenztheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Risikoaversion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verlust | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Test | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Reference points and effort provision | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 589814613 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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