EconStor >
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35705
  
Title:Reference points and effort provision PDF Logo
Authors:Abeler, Johannes
Falk, Armin
Götte, Lorenz
Huffman, David
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:IZA discussion papers 3939
Abstract:A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision. We find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low.
Subjects:Reference points
expectations
loss aversion
risk aversion
disappointment
experiment
JEL:C91
D01
D84
J22
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:101:1-2009020995
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
589814613.pdf427.9 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35705

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.