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dc.contributor.authorDur, Roberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-11-28en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:55:09Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:55:09Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20081127685en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35672-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention. Contrary to the traditional gift-exchange hypothesis, we show that altruistic managers may offer lower wages and nevertheless build up better social-exchange relationships with their employees than egoistic managers do. In such equilibria, a low wage signals to employees that the manager has something else to offer - namely, a lot of attention - which will induce the employee to stay at the firm and work hard. Our predictions are well in line with some recent empirical findings about gift exchange in the field.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA discussion papers 3839en_US
dc.subject.jelD86en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordManager-employee relationshipsen_US
dc.subject.keywordwagesen_US
dc.subject.keywordextra-role behavioren_US
dc.subject.keywordsabotageen_US
dc.subject.keywordgift exchangeen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial exchangeen_US
dc.subject.keywordconditional altruismen_US
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordsignaling gameen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsbeziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Beziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwAngestellteen_US
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorie (Soziologie)en_US
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen_US
dc.subject.stwVerantwortungen_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleGift exchange in the workplace: money or attention?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn586011722en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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