Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35586 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 4165
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Does the supply of a welfare state create its own demand? Many economic scholars studying welfare arrangements refer to Say's law and insinuate a self-destructive welfare state. However, little is known about the empirical validity of these assumptions and hypotheses. We study the dynamic effect of different welfare arrangements on benefit fraud. In particular, we analyze the impact of the welfare state on the respective social norm, i.e. benefit morale. It turns out that a high level of public social expenditures and a high unemployment rate are associated with a small positive (or no) immediate impact on benefit morale, which however is crowded out by adverse medium and long run effects.
Schlagwörter: 
Welfare state
social norms
benefit fraud
benefit morale
JEL: 
A13
I30
I38
J65
J68
H20
Z13
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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