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IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35572
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| Title: | | The efficient and fair approval of multiple-cost - single-benefit projects under unilateral information  |
| Authors: | | Kahana, Nava Mealem, Yosef Nitzan, Shmuel |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | IZA discussion papers 4181 |
| Abstract: | | This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-costsingle-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers have information only on each other's costs. |
| Subjects: | | Indivisible project single beneficiary multiple-cost bearers unilateral information efficient and fair implementation |
| JEL: | | D61 D62 D78 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:101:1-2009061254 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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