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Title:The efficient and fair approval of multiple-cost - single-benefit projects under unilateral information PDF Logo
Authors:Kahana, Nava
Mealem, Yosef
Nitzan, Shmuel
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:IZA discussion papers 4181
Abstract:This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-costsingle-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers have information only on each other's costs.
Subjects:Indivisible project
single beneficiary
multiple-cost bearers
unilateral information
efficient and fair implementation
JEL:D61
D62
D78
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:101:1-2009061254
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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