Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35532 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 4179
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We examine the second-best family policy under the assumption that both the number and the future earning capacities of the children born to a couple are random variables with probability distributions conditional on unobservable parental actions. Potential parents take their decisions without taking into account the effects of these actions on the government's future tax revenue. The second-best policy provides parents with credit and insurance, and allows them to appropriate the external benefits of their actions.
Subjects: 
Stochastic quantity and quality of children
moral hazard
population externalities
family allowances
scholarships
pensions
JEL: 
D13
D78
D82
H31
J13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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