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dc.contributor.authorLehmann, Etienneen_US
dc.contributor.authorParmentier, Alexisen_US
dc.contributor.authorvan der Linden, Brunoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-11-11en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:52:33Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:52:33Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20081126795en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35495-
dc.description.abstractThis paper characterizes the optimal redistributive taxation when individuals are heterogeneous in two exogenous dimensions: their skills and their values of non-market activities. Search-matching frictions on the labor markets create unemployment. Wages, labor demand and participation are endogenous. The government only observes wage levels. Under a Maximin objective, if the elasticity of participation decreases along the distribution of skills, at the optimum, the average tax rate is increasing, marginal tax rates are positive everywhere, while wages, unemployment rates and participation rates are distorted downwards compared to their laissez-faire values. A simulation exercise confirms some of these properties under a general utilitarian objective. Taking account of the wage-cum-labor demand margin deeply changes the equity-efficiency trade-off.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA discussion papers 3804en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordNon-linear taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordredistributionen_US
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordrandom participationen_US
dc.subject.keywordunemploymenten_US
dc.subject.keywordlabor market frictionsen_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerprogressionen_US
dc.subject.stwFriktionelle Arbeitslosigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsangeboten_US
dc.subject.stwLohnniveauen_US
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarkttheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOptimal income taxation with endogenous participation and search unemploymenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn584695683en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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