Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35480
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dc.contributor.authorBoeri, Titoen_US
dc.contributor.authorSevergnini, Battistaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-10-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:52:22Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:52:22Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2008111487en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35480-
dc.description.abstractThis paper contributes to the literature on competition and corruption, by drawing on records from Calciopoli, a judicial inquiry carried out in 2006 on corruption in the Italian soccer league. Unlike previous studies, we can estimate the determinants of match rigging and use this information in identifying corruption episodes in years in which there are no pending judicial inquiries. We find evidence of corruption activity well before Calciopoli. Career concerns of referees seem to play a major role in match rigging. An implication of our study is that a more transparent selection of the referees and evaluation of their performance is essential in removing incentives to match rigging. Another implication is that in presence of significant winners-take-all effects, more competitive balance may increase corruption unless media concentration is also significantly reduced.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA discussion papers |x3745en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordConcentrationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcareer concernsen_US
dc.subject.keywordrandom effect ordered probiten_US
dc.subject.keywordMonte Carlo simulationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocceren_US
dc.subject.stwFußballsporten_US
dc.subject.stwProfessioneller Sporten_US
dc.subject.stwBetrugen_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwSchiedsgerichtsbarkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwKarriereplanungen_US
dc.subject.stwMedienwirtschaften_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftskonzentrationen_US
dc.subject.stwItalienen_US
dc.titleThe Italian job: match rigging, career concerns and media concentration in Serie Aen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn581794346en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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