Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35480 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBoeri, Titoen
dc.contributor.authorSevergnini, Battistaen
dc.date.accessioned2008-10-14-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:52:22Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:52:22Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2008111487en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35480-
dc.description.abstractThis paper contributes to the literature on competition and corruption, by drawing on records from Calciopoli, a judicial inquiry carried out in 2006 on corruption in the Italian soccer league. Unlike previous studies, we can estimate the determinants of match rigging and use this information in identifying corruption episodes in years in which there are no pending judicial inquiries. We find evidence of corruption activity well before Calciopoli. Career concerns of referees seem to play a major role in match rigging. An implication of our study is that a more transparent selection of the referees and evaluation of their performance is essential in removing incentives to match rigging. Another implication is that in presence of significant winners-take-all effects, more competitive balance may increase corruption unless media concentration is also significantly reduced.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3745en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordConcentrationen
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordcareer concernsen
dc.subject.keywordrandom effect ordered probiten
dc.subject.keywordMonte Carlo simulationsen
dc.subject.keywordsocceren
dc.subject.stwFußballsporten
dc.subject.stwProfessioneller Sporten
dc.subject.stwBetrugen
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwSchiedsgerichtsbarkeiten
dc.subject.stwKarriereplanungen
dc.subject.stwMedienwirtschaften
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftskonzentrationen
dc.subject.stwItalienen
dc.titleThe Italian job: match rigging, career concerns and media concentration in Serie A-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn581794346en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
457.03 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.