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dc.contributor.authorMarchesi, Silviaen_US
dc.contributor.authorSabani, Lauraen_US
dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-03-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:52:15Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:52:15Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2009032389en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35470-
dc.description.abstractWe focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed optimal. To the contrary, when local knowledge is more important than the agency bias we expect delegation to dominate. Controlling for economic and political factors, our empirical tests show that the number of IMF conditions is lower in countries with a greater social complexity, while it increases with the bias of the countries' authorities, openness, and transparency, consistently with the theory.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA discussion papers 4041en_US
dc.subject.jelC23en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelF33en_US
dc.subject.jelN2en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordIMF conditionalityen_US
dc.subject.keyworddelegationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcommunicationen_US
dc.subject.keywordpanel dataen_US
dc.subject.stwAnpassungsprogramm des IWFen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationaler Krediten_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwKommunikationen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsländeren_US
dc.titleAgency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidenceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn595037550en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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