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Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35470
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Marchesi, Silvia | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Sabani, Laura | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Dreher, Axel | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-03-27 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-07-07T11:52:15Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-07-07T11:52:15Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.pi | | urn:nbn:de:101:1-2009032389 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35470 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed optimal. To the contrary, when local knowledge is more important than the agency bias we expect delegation to dominate. Controlling for economic and political factors, our empirical tests show that the number of IMF conditions is lower in countries with a greater social complexity, while it increases with the bias of the countries' authorities, openness, and transparency, consistently with the theory. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | IZA Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | IZA discussion papers 4041 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C23 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F33 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | N2 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | IMF conditionality | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | delegation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | communication | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | panel data | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Anpassungsprogramm des IWF | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Internationaler Kredit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Informationsverhalten | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kommunikation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Agency Theory | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Welt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Entwicklungsländer | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 595037550 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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