|
EconStor >
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35470
|
| | |
| Title: | | Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence  |
| Authors: | | Marchesi, Silvia Sabani, Laura Dreher, Axel |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | IZA discussion papers 4041 |
| Abstract: | | We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed optimal. To the contrary, when local knowledge is more important than the agency bias we expect delegation to dominate. Controlling for economic and political factors, our empirical tests show that the number of IMF conditions is lower in countries with a greater social complexity, while it increases with the bias of the countries' authorities, openness, and transparency, consistently with the theory. |
| Subjects: | | IMF conditionality delegation communication panel data |
| JEL: | | C23 D82 F33 N2 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:101:1-2009032389 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35470
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|