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dc.contributor.authorBallester, Coralioen_US
dc.contributor.authorCalvó-Armengol, Antonien_US
dc.contributor.authorZenou, Yvesen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-05-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:51:40Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:51:40Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20090513194en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35421-
dc.description.abstractDelinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among delinquents are modeled by means of a graph where delinquents compete for a booty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbors. Each delinquent decides in a non-cooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. Using the network model developed by Ballester et al. (2006), we characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy, which targets the delinquent who, once removed, leads to the highest aggregate delinquency reduction. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal for delinquency reduction, the key player, to optimal group removal, the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex since it depends on wages and on the structure of the network.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA discussion papers 4122en_US
dc.subject.jelA14en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSocial networksen_US
dc.subject.keyworddelinquency decisionen_US
dc.subject.keywordkey groupen_US
dc.subject.keywordNP-hard problemen_US
dc.subject.keywordcrime policiesen_US
dc.subject.stwKriminalitäten_US
dc.subject.stwSoziales Netzwerken_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwKriminalitätsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwKriminalpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDelinquent networksen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn599234903en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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