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Title:Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation PDF Logo
Authors:Reuben, Ernesto
Suetens, Sigrid
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:IZA discussion papers 4107
Abstract:We use a novel experimental design to disentangle strategically- and non-strategically-motivated cooperation. By using contingent responses in a repeated sequential prisoners' dilemma with a known probabilistic end, we differentiate end-game behavior from continuation behavior within individuals while controlling for expectations. This design allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the so-called end-game effect. Experiments with two different subject pools indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic and that the extent to which end-game effects are driven by strategically-cooperating individuals depends on the profitability of cooperation.
Subjects:Reputation building
strong reciprocity
conditional cooperation
strategic cooperation
JEL:C91
D01
D74
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:101:1-2009051332
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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