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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35405
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| Title: | | Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation  |
| Authors: | | Reuben, Ernesto Suetens, Sigrid |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | IZA discussion papers 4107 |
| Abstract: | | We use a novel experimental design to disentangle strategically- and non-strategically-motivated cooperation. By using contingent responses in a repeated sequential prisoners' dilemma with a known probabilistic end, we differentiate end-game behavior from continuation behavior within individuals while controlling for expectations. This design allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the so-called end-game effect. Experiments with two different subject pools indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic and that the extent to which end-game effects are driven by strategically-cooperating individuals depends on the profitability of cooperation. |
| Subjects: | | Reputation building strong reciprocity conditional cooperation strategic cooperation |
| JEL: | | C91 D01 D74 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:101:1-2009051332 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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