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dc.contributor.authorPolachek, Solomon W.en
dc.contributor.authorXiang, Junen
dc.date.accessioned2008-12-15-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:51:22Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:51:22Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20081218105en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35396-
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows that the opportunity costs resulting from economic interdependence decrease the equilibrium probability of war in an incomplete information game. This result is strongly consistent with existing empirical analyses of the inverse trade-conflict relationship, but is the opposite of the conclusion reached by Gartzke et al. (2001), who reject the opportunity cost argument in a game-theoretic framework. As a result of this paper's findings, one cannot dismiss the opportunity cost argument as the explanation why trading nations fight less. Instead this study reaffirms the central position of opportunity costs as the basis for the inverse trade-conflict relationship, thus implying that one need not rely on signaling.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3883en
dc.subject.jelF10en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordWaren
dc.subject.keywordconflicten
dc.subject.keywordtradeen
dc.subject.keywordtrade-conflict relationshipen
dc.subject.keywordinterdependenceen
dc.subject.keywordincomplete information gameen
dc.subject.keywordsignalingen
dc.subject.stwKriegen
dc.subject.stwPolitischer Konflikten
dc.subject.stwOpportunitätskostenen
dc.subject.stwInternationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungenen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommene Informationen
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleHow opportunity costs decrease the probability of war in an incomplete information game-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn588007382en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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