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dc.contributor.authorPolachek, Solomon W.en_US
dc.contributor.authorXiang, Junen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-12-15en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:51:22Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:51:22Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20081218105en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35396-
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows that the opportunity costs resulting from economic interdependence decrease the equilibrium probability of war in an incomplete information game. This result is strongly consistent with existing empirical analyses of the inverse trade-conflict relationship, but is the opposite of the conclusion reached by Gartzke et al. (2001), who reject the opportunity cost argument in a game-theoretic framework. As a result of this paper's findings, one cannot dismiss the opportunity cost argument as the explanation why trading nations fight less. Instead this study reaffirms the central position of opportunity costs as the basis for the inverse trade-conflict relationship, thus implying that one need not rely on signaling.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA discussion papers 3883en_US
dc.subject.jelF10en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordWaren_US
dc.subject.keywordconflicten_US
dc.subject.keywordtradeen_US
dc.subject.keywordtrade-conflict relationshipen_US
dc.subject.keywordinterdependenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordincomplete information gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordsignalingen_US
dc.subject.stwKriegen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitischer Konflikten_US
dc.subject.stwOpportunit├Ątskostenen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommene Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleHow opportunity costs decrease the probability of war in an incomplete information gameen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn588007382en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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