Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35310
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dc.contributor.authorHarbring, Christineen_US
dc.contributor.authorIrlenbusch, Bernden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-24en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:50:20Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:50:20Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20090615204en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35310-
dc.description.abstractAlthough relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm one of the key insights from theory: effort and sabotage increase with the wage spread. Additionally, we find that even in the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages, which mitigates the sabotage problem. Destructive activities are reduced by explicitly calling them by their name 'sabotage'. Communication among principal and agents curbs sabotage due to agreements on flat prize structures and increased output.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA discussion papers |x4205en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelJ41en_US
dc.subject.jelL23en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSabotageen_US
dc.subject.keywordtournamenten_US
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordrelative performance schemeen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.subject.stwExtensives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsethiken_US
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorie (Soziologie)en_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleSabotage in tournaments: evidence from a laboratory experimenten_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn605358621en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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