Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35310 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHarbring, Christineen
dc.contributor.authorIrlenbusch, Bernden
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-24-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:50:20Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:50:20Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20090615204en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35310-
dc.description.abstractAlthough relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm one of the key insights from theory: effort and sabotage increase with the wage spread. Additionally, we find that even in the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages, which mitigates the sabotage problem. Destructive activities are reduced by explicitly calling them by their name 'sabotage'. Communication among principal and agents curbs sabotage due to agreements on flat prize structures and increased output.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x4205en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelJ41en
dc.subject.jelL23en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSabotageen
dc.subject.keywordtournamenten
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen
dc.subject.keywordrelative performance schemeen
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten
dc.subject.stwExtensives Spielen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsethiken
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorie (Soziologie)en
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleSabotage in tournaments: evidence from a laboratory experiment-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn605358621en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
333.79 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.