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Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35310
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Harbring, Christine | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Irlenbusch, Bernd | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-07-24 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-07-07T11:50:20Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-07-07T11:50:20Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.pi | | urn:nbn:de:101:1-20090615204 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35310 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm one of the key insights from theory: effort and sabotage increase with the wage spread. Additionally, we find that even in the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages, which mitigates the sabotage problem. Destructive activities are reduced by explicitly calling them by their name 'sabotage'. Communication among principal and agents curbs sabotage due to agreements on flat prize structures and increased output. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | IZA Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | IZA discussion papers 4205 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M52 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J33 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J41 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L23 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C91 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Sabotage | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | tournament | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | reciprocity | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | relative performance scheme | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | experiment | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Extensives Spiel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Leistungsorientierte Vergütung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Leistungsmotivation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Arbeitsethik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Austauschtheorie (Soziologie) | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Test | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Sabotage in tournaments: evidence from a laboratory experiment | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 605358621 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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