Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35309
Authors: 
Andaluz, Joaquín
Marcén, Miriam
Molina, José Alberto
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
IZA discussion papers 3757
Abstract: 
This paper studies the dynamics of bargaining in an intrahousehold context. To explore long-term partner relationships, we analyse bilateral bargaining by considering that spouses take decisions sequentially. We conclude that a greater valuation of the present, rather than the future, for the spouse who takes the second decision, increases the set of possible sustainable agreements, as well as the proportion of time that this agent devotes to a family good.
Subjects: 
Family bargaining
Stackelberg game
family good
JEL: 
C71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
134.24 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.